Philosophers have done very little work on what makes trade fair. Perhaps the most extensive discussion is Malgorzata Kurjanska and Mathias Risse's paper, "Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and the Fair Trade Movement." ii In their paper, Kurjanska and Risse consider the case for trade subsidies and the Fair Trade movement. They suggest that it is not permissible for developed countries to give their producers subsidies because doing so does not strike an appropriate balance between meeting the needs of the global poor while protecting domestic workers. iii Kurjanska and Risse also argue that the case for Fair Trade hinges, primarily, on whether or not it is part of the best development strategy for poor countries.
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Kurjanska and Risse are not convinced. They do not think Fair Trade bananas are really different from regular bananas because they have different moral characteristics. xxvi Furthermore, they think that, although the Fair Trade certified banana-production processes may be fairer, purchasing Fair Trade bananas may lead to a less fair world over time. Consumer choice is not more important than pursing the best development strategy for the poor.
In short, Kurjanska and Risse do not think purchasing Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development strategy. So, they conclude that it is only permissible to buy Fair Trade certified goods because there is no reason to think purchasing Fair Trade goods will have a real impact in any case; Fair Trade does not have a large enough market share to matter. xxvii
IV. Critique of Kurjanska and Risse's Argument
This section takes issue with Kurjanska and Risse's arguments against (most) subsidies and Fair Trade. It does not question Kurjanska and Risse's claim that liberalization promotes growth and development. Nor does it question Kurjanska and Risse's claim that developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop. Rather this section questions Kurjanska and Risse's argument that free trade is not part of the best development strategy. When Kurjanska and Risse talk about subsidies, their argument rests on some undefended empirical claims about the growth and incentive effects of free trade vs. different kinds of subsidies. The data does not support their case --even subsidies that are not backed by the best intentions may be part of the best development strategy. When Kurjanska and Risse talk about Fair Trade, they only provide theoretical reason to think that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy. Theoretical argument cannot make this case, empirical evidence is necessary; it is possible to give a theoretical argument for Fair Trade being part of the best development strategy as strong as the argument against this conclusion Kurjanska and Risse offer. So, since Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite empirical evidence to show that (most) subsidies and Fair Trade are not part of the best development strategy; they have not made their case for free trade.
Before beginning, however, it is worth noting a general problem with Kurjanska and Risse's arguments. A Rawlsian framework does not apply to policies (let alone consumer choice!) directly but to institutions. xxviii There are significant problems for trying to evaluate policies in isolation using a Rawlsian framework. xxix Even if a sate's policy seems to maximize the position of that state's least well off subjects, a different policy might bring greater gains to these subjects if background policies are changed. Even policies that seem to harm the least well off may be required because they, in combination with a different set of policies maximize the position of the least well off. The relevant analysis is probably too complicated to carry out. This provides one reason to think that it is hard, if not impossible, to figure out what the best development strategy is in general. Hopefully this will become clear below. But the following arguments should stand alone, even if this worry can be averted. xxx
Subsidies
Kurjanska and Risse do not specify exactly what they intend to count as a subsidy. In the economic literature many kinds of governmental support to a producers count as subsidies. xxxi But because Kurjanska and Risse end up defending something like the WTO's policy on subsidies we might begin by reflecting on what the WTO says about subsidies. The WTO specifies that "there are two general types of subsidies: export and domestic. An export subsidy is a benefit conferred on a firm by the government that is contingent on exports. A domestic subsidy is a benefit not directly linked to exports." xxxii As we have already seen, Kurjanska and Risse seem to be most concerned about export subsidies because they believe these subsidies are more trade distorting than other kinds of domestic producer support. So, in responding to their arguments this section will focus primarily on showing that some export subsidies are acceptable.
The arguments below should also apply more broadly, however.
There are a few reasons why the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be acceptable. First, Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite evidence to show that because free trade "plays a crucial role for growth" and development, "trade-liberalization becomes mandatory for developed countries." xxxiii Second, Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite evidence to show that the subsides they reject are more trade-distorting than the subsidies they prefer. Third, even if the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject are more trade distorting than those they prefer, the subsidies they reject may be the most effective way to help poor countries develop in our non-ideal world. Let us consider each of these points in turn. We will then provide a further argument to show that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may (1) have a role to play in ensuring that compensation is provided to poor losers from liberalization even if (2) they are not backed by the best intentions. Although concern for the poor may function as a cover for subsidies that do not benefit (or even harm) the poor, institutional mechanisms might prevent such abuse. This final argument may indirectly help support the claim that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be the most effective way to help poor countries develop in our non-ideal world.
Recall that Kurjanska and Risse start by assuming a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework on which developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop. xxxiv They then note that there is a good deal of evidence that free trade "plays a crucial role for growth as well as for other desirable goals of development, such as those listed as the U.N. Millennium Goals." xxxv Kurjanska and Risse cannot, however, conclude from this, as they try to do, that "trade-liberalization becomes mandatory for developed countries." xxxvi Trade may lead to growth in many ways. Some ways of increasing growth may help poor countries and the poor within them, others do not. xxxvii Countries can grow, for instance, if only the rich become better off. xxxviii Similarly, although free trade probably does help some countries meet other important development goals, Kurjanska and Risse must show more than this. To show that free trade is required of developed countries, they must argue that free trade is the best way of meeting these goals; they must show that it is not better to allow some of the subsidies they reject. Free trade may not be the best way of helping poor countries develop.
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that states should protect their citizens against the fortitudes of the market with production subsidies because production subsides are not trade-distorting, while most other subsides distort trade and result in net losses. They do not defend their claim that production subsides are not trade-distorting while most other subsides distort trade and result in net losses. And there is little reason to believe this. Some argue, for instance, that many of the subsidies that are legal under the WTO, including those Kurjanska and Risse prefer, are trade-distorting and, more to the point, some argue that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer are bad for the poor.
xxxix These subsidies may even be worse for the poor than the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject. Some of the subsides Kurjanska and Risse are objecting to may be no more distorting than production subsidies and, even if the subsides Kurjanska and Risse reject do result in a net loss, they may not only help rich workers but may be the best way to help the poor. In our imperfect world, the needy may gain more from distortions than they would gain from unrestricted free trade xl (and distortions may not make it more difficult for countries to protect their citizens against the fortitudes of the market). What kinds of market reforms are best probably depends on a variety of factors. It may matter, for instance, how easily employers can substitute one kind of labor (e.g. high skill) for another (e.g. low skill) in the production process. xli And, there is even evidence that, under some conditions, export subsides can be more efficient than the production subsidies Kurjanska and Risse seem to prefer. xlii Furthermore, even if the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject are the most trade-distorting, and trade-distorting subsidies are rarely one of the best ways to help poor countries develop in theory, we do not live in a perfect world. There may be reasons of political economy to use such subsidies rather than other market reforms to help these countries. xliii It may be easier, for instance, to get developed countries or corporate producers to reduce poverty through the threat of export subsidies than through taxes or other market reforms. There may even be some cases where the only realistic way to reduce poverty is to threaten to use trade-distorting subsidies to get countries to stop decimating their populations or ignoring the basic needs of their citizens. Such threats may be essential in getting some countries to agree to international development treaties, for instance. There may also be few other ways to punish those who do not live up to their commitment not to harm the poor. xliv
None of this means that allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject will more effectively help the poor than only allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer. It is entirely possible, for instance, that only allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer may be best for the poor even if there are some costs to allowing those subsidies. xlv The point is just that Kurjanska and Risse have not given us any reason to think that it is best to only allow the subsidies they prefer. In the absence of (extremely difficult, if not impossible, to collect) empirical evidence about what actually best fulfills our moral obligations, liberal egalitarians have no reason to reject all export subsidies but allow other kinds of producer support. Export subsidies may sometimes be required. Other kinds of producer support may sometimes be unjustifiable. Kurjanska and Risse have not made their case against the subsidies they reject.
Liberalization may not be mandatory and (even trade-distorting) subsidies may sometimes be appropriate.
So, it is not clearly acceptable for the WTO to generally reject export subsidies but allow other kinds of producer support.
It is possible to put the point in a way that Kurjanska and Risse might find more appealing.
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that we need to make sure that whatever free trade occurs brings fair benefits to the poor. They note that the growth free trade brings may benefit some more than others and may even cause some problems for the poor. They suggest, for instance, that we must ensure that even net food importing countries benefit from free trade for trade to be fair. As Kurjanska and Risse intimate, one possibility is to use some of the gains from trade amongst WTO member countries to compensate the poorest countries when they are hurt by free trade. But the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be the best way to compensate poor countries.
One way to make sure trade benefits the poor is to restructure the rules of global trade so that they intentioned concern about poverty to gain economic benefits for themselves. Ethanol producers might, for instance, cite worries about the food security of net food importing countries as a reason for subsidizing US corn production. li So, Kurjanska and Risse might conclude that ill intentioned subsidies are impermissible. This is not compelling. Some collusion between self-interested producers or consumers and those who genuinely care about world poverty may not be bad. It may be possible to build coalitions of those who care about the global poor and those seeking protection (this is likely as the groups are not mutually exclusive). lii It may then be possible to adopt appropriate trade policy more quickly. If the global poor will benefit appropriately from keeping corn prices low, it may be acceptable for ethanol producers to try to secure subsidies. The best development strategy may allow ill intentioned subsidies.
Still, it is clear that there may be a problem. Concern for the poor may function as a cover for subsidies that do not benefit (or even harm) the poor. Low corn prices may not even help those who are currently poor in aggregate and the environmental effects of ethanol may be devastating for poor people in future generations. Advocates of the poor may even be fooled into supporting such harmful subsidies.
Fortunately, there are a few ways we might address this problem. One is through the dispute resolution panels of international trade agreements like the WTO. These panels may develop standards for judging whether subsidies will actually reduce poverty appropriately (in light of the needs of tradedisplaced workers). If proposed measures to benefit the poor do not benefit the poor appropriately then, unless there is another reason to implement such measures, they should be prohibited. liii Educating those who care about the poor so that they will not be fooled into supporting inappropriate trade policies may also help prevent such exploitation. Of course, it is risky to allow ill intentioned subsidies. But, the fact that such protectionism can hurt the poor does not tell against allowing even ill-intentioned subsides when they best promote development.
Trade-liberalization is not mandatory for developed countries even if it promotes growth and development and developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop.
Contra Kurjanska and Risse, allowing even ill-intentioned subsidies may even be the best way of ensuring that the poor benefit fairly from trade.
Fair Trade
Many of the above points regarding subsidies also apply to Kurjanska and Risse's arguments Furthermore, it is easy to construct a compelling theoretical argument for the conclusion that Fair
Trade will make some poor people better off without making any of them worse off. It is even possible to give a theoretical argument that purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development strategy.
Consider, first, how Fair Trade might make some poor people better off without making any of them worse of. In particular, consider how a consumers' buying Fair Trade bananas (for instance) is always better for the poor than buying non-Fair Trade bananas. To make this argument, let us (1) make the standard economic assumptions lvi and assume that (2) some of the profit from making Fair Trade rather than regular bananas is passed on to the poor, (3) consumers do not change the amount of bananas they purchase, and (4) consumers will continue to buy Fair Trade bananas into perpetuity. lvii Suppose a consumer will either purchase bananas from a Fair Trade source for (say) $2 a bag or non-Fair Trade source for $1 a bag. If the consumer buys from a Fair Trade source the poor people who receive her money would, without her money, either have gone out of business or not. If the poor people she supports would otherwise have gone out of business they would have either gone into a more profitable business (than the regular banana business) or not. If not, then the consumer has benefited them. If the poor people the consumer supports would have otherwise gone into a more profitable business (say sugar) then they have done better to make Fair Trade bananas, otherwise they would have gone into sugar. lviii 
Recall the claim underlying many of Kurjanska and Risse conclusions: Fair Trade is morally acceptable only if it is part of the best development strategy. If it is possible to do so, we should probably try to figure out whether purchasing any Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development strategy.
But it is very difficult if not impossible to determine what the best development strategy is in general.
Hence, the fact that we do not know that a strategy is best is not a reason against pursing it. If, on the other hand, we have reason to think a strategy will help some poor people and do not have reason to think the strategy will harm more than help the poor, there is reason to use that strategy. Such a strategy may even be morally required.
Although the picture is not always rosy and Fair Trade may sometimes fail to improve incomes, for instance, there is evidence that Fair Trade can bring many benefits to poor people in developing countries. lxi As one Fair Trade coffee farmer reported:
Before, life was very hard for us, mainly because we could never get a decent price for our coffee. Now we have our own export co-op, and we sell to the Fair Trade market. Fair Trade gives us a fair price and access to credit. It also gives us dignity. There is even evidence that farmers participating in Fair Trade programs are better able to educate their children lxxi and meet their basic needs for things like food, water, and housing. lxxii As another Fair
Trade farmer put it:
The higher price we get when we sell coffee to Cafedirect means that now our cooperative can afford to pay a doctor who will give treatment to our members. For myself, the price difference has meant I can afford more food for my family and send my children to school properly equipped with pens and notebooks for the first time. lxxiii
In short, there is evidence that Fair Trade often helps poor people in developing countries increase their incomes, meet their basic needs, reduce their vulnerability in times of crisis, and retain their farms. lxxiv Yet other researchers suggest that there other benefits of participation in Fair Trade organizations. lxxv As the European Fair Trade Association puts it:
[t]he producer-fair trader relationships usually go beyond just selling and buying, and can include the joint development of new products or product lines, the adaptation of products to European fashions, gaining access to new marketing channels, raising investment or working capital and strengthening or expanding the producer organization. lxxvi
As Laura Raynolds reports in "Poverty Alleviation Through Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Existing
Research and Critical Issues," participating in Fair Trade programs can help farmers develop their organizational capacities within cooperatives. lxxvii Or, as another Fair Trade farmer reports: "We have gained a much better knowledge of the international market and of course the price is better." lxxviii Studies also suggest that Fair Trade organizations enhance the capacity of participating cooperatives to market their goods lxxix and have other positive effects on producers because it helps them organize. lxxx In "Coffee, Cooperatives and Competition: The Impact of Fair Trade," for instance, Anna Milford uses a theoretical model and case study evidence to argue that the Fair Trade premium helps cooperatives maintain cohesion and use collective bargaining power to destabilize cartels and secure higher prices for farmers' products.
Milford suggests that these co-operatives not only improve welfare by providing education and credit services but by giving farmers essential information and lobbying power. lxxxi To account for differences between those in the groups that are not explained by the Fair Trade program researchers create "balancing scores" to try to maximize the probability that participants will be relevantly similar to non-participants. Researchers do propensity score matching. They look at individuals' observable characteristics (e.g. land holdings, wealth, health status and gender) that might impact program
results. On this basis, they try to figure out what each individual's probability of participating in a Fair
Trade program would be. The treatment and comparison groups are then made up of people whose estimated probabilities of participating are as similar as possible.
In the Center for International Development Issues' study, the researchers used a Probit model to look at the variables influencing participation in Fair Trade programs. They used economic theory, previous research, and information about the particular setting to build the model. Researchers compared participants' outcomes to those expected to be most similar to them. lxxxiv Then, researchers ran regression analyses to see whether participation in Fair Trade organizations had a significant impact on productivity, access to health insurance, credit and so forth. lxxxv They found that the Fair Trade programs they studied generally increased participants' food consumption and access to credit. On average, participants made more housing, land, and educational investments than those in the non-Fair Trade comparison group. lxxxvi Researchers found that participants were also more willing to accept risk and invest in the futurebehaviors many argue are essential for escaping poverty. lxxxvii Notably, some of the studies even tested for Although Fair Trade will not help everyone it can certainly benefit some. So, in the absence of evidence that Fair Trade will harm the poor more than it will help them in all cases (I know of no such evidence), there is reason to purchase some Fair Trade certified goods. Purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods (from those projects which do not harm the poor more than they help the poor) may even be morally required. This conclusion can be strengthened if, as Kurjanska and Risse implicitly admit in responding to the collective-preference-based argument for Fair Trade, the production processes consumers support when they purchase Fair Trade certified goods are fairer in themselves than the production processes consumers support when they purchase regular goods.
Subsidies
Finally, we can provide a similar argument for giving some subsidies. We do not know which, if any, subsidies are part of the best development strategy. If it is possible to do so, we should probably try to figure out which, if any, subsidies are part of this strategy. In the absence of this very difficult (if not impossible) to collect information, however, Kurjanska and Risse should agree that developed countries have reason to give some subsidies. After all, Kurjanska and Risse implicitly agree that some rich country subsidies probably help some poor people and there is compelling evidence for this conclusion. xci As they note, if we liberalize trade in agricultural goods (reducing developed country export subsidies), net food importing countries will probably have to pay higher prices for food and, if so, will probably do worse. xcii Many of these countries are poor. xciii Liberalizing trade in Southern Africa's staple commodities, for instance, would probably be devastating for many countries in Southern Africa as many of these countries are net food importers. xciv So, some of the current (e.g.) export subsidies probably redound to the advantage of the poorest in these net food importing countries. xcv Kurjanska and Risse might object that there is a great deal of evidence that "the aggregative importance of trade for development" is large. xcvi Restricting free trade by offering even some subsidies may hurt the poor. Subsidies may not be part of the best development strategy.
Kurjanska and Risse cannot rest their case for subsidies on the claim that "the aggregative importance of trade for development" is large. xcvii This claim cannot show that some subsidies are not part of the best development strategy. xcviii To reach the conclusion that all subsidies are impermissible, Kurjanska and Risse would also have to defend the proposition that, everything considered, having some subsidies will be worse than having none at all. They do not provide this evidence. xcix Otherwise, given that we have evidence that some subsidies can do some good, there is reason to give some subsidies. c Giving some subsidies may even be morally required. ci
IV. Conclusion
This paper has taken issue with the main philosophical argument against trade-distorting subsidies and Fair Trade in the literature. Contra Kurjanska and Risse, it suggested that trade-liberalization is not mandatory for developed countries even if it promotes growth and development and developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop. Giving some subsidies may be an acceptable way to help the poor. Similarly, it may be a good thing if people purchase some Fair Trade certified goods. Finally, this paper argued that giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods may even be morally required. Very roughly, it suggested that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to figure out what the best development strategy is, in general. So, the fact that we do not know that a particular development strategy is best is not a reason against pursing it. We have reason to think giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods will help some poor people and that Fair Trade is fairer in itself. cii We do not have reason to think giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods will harm the poor more than it will help the poor. So, if this argument goes through, there is reason to give some subsidies and purchase some Fair Trade certified goods. We may even be obligated to do so. But, even if this final argument does not go through, the case against subsidies and Fair Trade Kurjanska and Risse present is much weaker than they make out.
i I owe many thanks for comments not only on this paper but to those who helped me with the papers I needed to write in order to write this one so this acknowledgement will surely remain incomplete. xliii It is hard to provide real examples here without descending into significant empirical detail (it is hard to establish even that a sanction did reduce poverty never mind the counter-factual that no other policy would have been better able to reduce poverty). The theoretical point can, however, be made with a simple example. Consider, for instance, how giving an export subsidy to rich workers could help the poor. Suppose that there Rich is a very large country and subsidizes exports of its muskrat production. This will lower world prices for muskrats increasing the profit to muskrat producers in Rich but decreasing the profit to muskrat producers abroad and benefiting foreign muskrat consumers. If foreign muskrat producers are well off but only the foreign poor consume muskrats the poor in present generations may benefit from the subsidy. If the only alternative to muskrat production is porcupine production and muskrats produce less greenhouse gas than porcupines, the subsidy might even decrease the amount of climate change that occurs and be good for poor people in future generations. If WTO rules allowed countries to use (less fanciful) subsidies wish such features, such trade policy could provide a useful tool for reducing poverty.
xliv Saying, as they do in a foot note, that allowing only non-trade distorting means of supporting producers is one way of satisfying claims proportionately seems either vacuous or question-begging in the present context. xcvii Ibid.
xcviii The poor might even benefit most from highly subsidized trade in combination with some other set of policies. This is related to the first worry about Kurjanska and Risse's arguments -the optimization problem that they need to solve to apply the Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework they espouse is too difficult.
xcix Reference withheld.
